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WINTER COUNT:* TAKING STOCK OF
ABORTION RIGHTS AFTER CASEY
AND CARHART
Caitlin E. Borgmann**
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,'
the landmark case that established the right to abortion as a funda-
mental constitutional right. The Court faced its first real opportu-
nity to reverse that monumental decision a mere sixteen years
later. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,2 the State of Mis-
souri and the United States explicitly asked the Court to overrule
Roe.3 Women in the United States waited anxiously to see whether
the Court would end the brief and besieged era of the constitu-
tional right to abortion.4 The Court in Webster ultimately ducked
the question, but its decision presaged a fundamental change in
how the Court would approach the right to abortion.5 The right
would be different from the one announced in Roe, and it would be
weaker.
Within three years of Webster, the Court's composition changed,
and the change boded ill for abortion rights. President George H.
W. Bush appointed Justices Souter and Thomas, in quick succes-
sion, to replace two of the Court's liberal stalwarts, Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall.6 Hot on the heels of this shift, the Court
accepted review of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,7 a case in which
the government again asked the Court to overrule Roe. The stakes
for abortion as a constitutional right could not have been higher.
* A winter count is a kind of calendar in which certain Native American tribes
took stock of the year by chronicling its most important events.
** Caitlin Borgmann is an Assistant Professor at CUNY School of Law. She was
State Strategies Coordinator of the American Civil Liberties Union's Reproductive
Freedom Project from 1996-2002. The author thanks John D. Lovi and Catherine
Weiss for their helpful comments.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
3. Id. The United States participated as amicus curiae.
4. In fact, women and pro-choice activists did more than wait passively. Web-
ster's filing in the Supreme Court occasioned a massive pro-choice march in Washing-
ton, D.C., that was attended by more than 300,000 demonstrators. See DAVID J.
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 674 (updated ed. 1998).
5. See infra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
6. Justice Souter was appointed in 1990 and Justice Thomas in 1991. SUPREME
COURT A TO Z 429, 470 (Kenneth Jost ed., 1998).
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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In a surprise decision, the Court declined to overturn Roe, with
an improbable alliance of Justices reaffirming what it called Roe's
"essential holding."8 The constitutional right to abortion had now
dodged its second bullet, this time with a Court that appeared even
less sympathetic to the abortion right. Some commentators pro-
claimed that the major legal battle over abortion was finished.9 In-
deed, today, at age thirty-one, Roe has yet to be expressly
overruled. The Court recently reaffirmed a woman's right to
choose abortion, striking down Nebraska's "partial-birth abortion"
ban in Stenberg v. Carhart.1° In that decision, the Court firmly an-
nounced it would not reexamine the constitutionality of abortion
rights: "This Court, in the course of a generation, has determined
and then redetermined that the Constitution offers basic protection
to the woman's right to choose .... We shall not revisit those legal
principles."'" A cursory look at Casey and Carhart might lead an
observer to conclude that, although the Court has renounced key
aspects of Roe's framework, the right to abortion remains well-pro-
tected under the federal Constitution.
But such a conclusion would ignore the implications of the
Court's decision in Casey and would place too much hope in Car-
hart. Casey fundamentally changed the character of the right to
abortion in this country, reinventing the right in a form more vul-
nerable to continued erosion.'" And Carhart, although drawing an
important line in the sand against extreme abortion measures, did
not alter this basic fact. 13 Justice Blackmun, Roe's author, had
forecast the sea change in his dissent in Webster. The worst of
Blackmun's fears have not been realized: abortion may not be
banned altogether and severe restrictions that obstruct access to
safe abortions are likewise impermissible. Beyond this bottom
line, however, little of Roe's protections remain and the right to
abortion continues to be burdened in ever more creative ways.
The women most at risk-including many poor women and teenag-
ers-cannot overcome all of the barriers and have effectively lost
8. Id. at 846; see infra text accompanying notes 36-44.
9. See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 4, at 737 ("After 1992 no serious scholar of the
Supreme Court could any longer doubt that the constitutional core of Roe, as upheld
and reaffirmed in Casey, was secure for all time.").
10. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
11. Id. at 921.
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See discussion infra Part III.
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their right to abortion.14 In this article, I examine Casey and Car-
hart to assess the state of abortion rights today.
1. WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services15 presented a constitu-
tional challenge to Missouri's omnibus abortion statute. 16 The leg-
islation was crafted by anti-choice activists specifically to put an
abortion test case before the Supreme Court.17 In a highly frac-
tured decision, a plurality of the Court declined to overrule Roe
explicitly although it upheld all of the statute's challenged provi-
sions.18 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, claimed that
the case "affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe,...
and we leave [Roe] undisturbed."19
Although it carefully avoided overruling Roe outright, the plu-
rality advocated limiting Roe dramatically.20 Justice Rehnquist's
opinion did not directly identify what level of review should apply
to abortion restrictions, but the plurality's deference to the state's
interests21 signaled a significant retreat from Roe's strict scrutiny
standard, the highest level of constitutional review. 22  Justice
Blackmun called the plurality's analysis "nothing more than a
dressed-up version of rational-basis review, this Court's most leni-
ent level of scrutiny. '23 The most hotly debated provision was a
viability-testing requirement for all abortions performed starting at
twenty weeks of pregnancy. 24 Admitting that this provision in-
creased the costs of abortions and curbed physician discretion,
14. See Stanley K. Henshaw & Larry B. Finer, Accessibility of Abortion Services in
the United States, 2001, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 16, 16 (2001).
15. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
16. Id. at 500-01.
17. See Eloise Salholz & Ann McDaniel, Battle over Abortion, NEWSWEEK, May 1,
1989, at 29-30.
18. 492 U.S. at 521.
19. Id. Rehnquist wrote for himself, Justice White, and the newly appointed Jus-
tice Kennedy.
20. Id. at 517-21. Justice O'Connor denied that the constitutional validity of Roe
and its precedents were even called into question in the case, suggesting that, when
the right case came before the Court, "there will be time enough to reexamine Roe.
And to do so carefully." Id. at 526 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). Justice Scalia, on the other hand, accused the Court of effectively
overruling Roe and said he "would do it more explicitly." Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment).
21. See id. at 519-21.
22. See 16A AM. JURIs. 2D, Constitutional Law § 387 (1998) (describing the strict
scrutiny test).
23. 492 U.S. at 555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 513-17 (plurality opinion).
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Rehnquist nonetheless proclaimed himself "satisfied that the re-
quirement of these tests permissibly furthers the State's interest in
protecting potential human life."25 Rehnquist concluded, "To the
extent indicated in our opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe
and succeeding cases. "26
Justice Blackmun, author of the majority opinion in Roe, saw a
dangerous duplicity in the plurality's approach:
Never in my memory has a plurality gone about its business in
such a deceptive fashion. At every level of its review.., the
plurality obscures the portent of its analysis. With feigned re-
straint, the plurality announces that its analysis leaves Roe "un-
disturbed," . . . [blut this disclaimer is totally meaningless. The
plurality opinion is filled with winks, and nods, and knowing
glances to those who would do away with Roe explicitly, but
turns a stone face to anyone in search of what the plurality con-
ceives as the scope of a woman's right under the Due Process
Clause to terminate a pregnancy free from the coercive and
brooding influence of the State. The simple truth is that Roe
would not survive the plurality's analysis, and that the plurality
provides no substitute for Roe's protective umbrella.27
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, three Justices offered that substi-
tute in the form of the undue burden test.
II. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY
The Court confronted another opportunity to overrule Roe just
three years later in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,28 but this time
the Court directly rebuffed the government's request that it do
so.29 Casey is widely known for upholding Roe v. Wade, but many
do not comprehend the extent to which Casey in fact dismantled
Roe's protective framework. Indeed, the majority opinion's sweep-
ing language, celebrating the importance of reproductive freedom
25. Id. at 519. Justice Blackmun lambasted this "newly minted standard" as "circu-
lar and totally meaningless." Id. at 554-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Blackmun
pointed out, "[w]hether a challenged abortion regulation 'permissibly furthers' a legit-
imate state interest is the question that courts must answer in abortion cases, not the
standard for courts to apply." Id. at 555.
26. Id. at 521.
27. Id. at 538 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Jus-
tice Scalia similarly accused the Court of "contriv[ing]" to avoid reaching the question
of Roe's legitimacy, id. at 532, claiming that, of all possible approaches, the plurality's
avoidance of the question was "the least responsible." Id. at 537.
28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
29. See id. at 846.
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for women's autonomy and equality,3° masked, perhaps deliber-
ately, the decision's alarming retreat from the lines the Court drew
in Roe.
The joint opinion31 opened dramatically, heartening those who
feared a total loss of the constitutional right to abortion: "Liberty
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. ' 32 The opinion went
on to decide that "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be
retained and once again reaffirmed. ' 33  Apprehensive women
reading these first pages of the joint opinion may well have
breathed a sigh of relief.34 Of course, the Court could have done
away completely with the constitutional right to abortion.
Viewed in that light, Casey was a victory. But readers who man-
aged to reach the latter parts of the voluminous joint opinion dis-
covered that the Justices' moving rhetoric was misleading.
The most obvious danger sign was that Casey upheld all but one
of the challenged provisions of the restrictive Pennsylvania Abor-
tion Control Act.36 Among other provisions, the joint opinion up-
30. Id. at 851-53.
31. The Court in Casey was splintered. In an unusual, jointly authored opinion,
three Justices (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) wrote for the majority (joined by
Blackmun and Stevens) reaffirming Roe's "essential holding," the medical emergency
exception of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, and striking down its spousal
notification requirement. Id. at 880-98. The three wrote alone in rejecting Roe's tri-
mester framework in favor of the undue burden standard and in upholding the
twenty-four-hour waiting period and parental notification provision (although Justice
Stevens concurred in the judgment as to the parental notification provision). Id. at
873-77. They were joined by Stevens in upholding the reporting and recordkeeping
requirements other than that relating to spousal notice. Id. at 900. Justices Rehn-
quist, White, Scalia, and Thomas would have overruled Roe. See id. at 944 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) ("We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and
should be overruled ... .
32. Id. at 844.
33. Id. at 846.
34. One commentator describes how journalists in the courtroom wept as the joint
opinion's authors read portions of their surprise opinion aloud. GARROW, supra note
4, at 693.
35. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Blackmun Papers: Documents Reveal the Evolu-
tion of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at Al.
In the spring of 1992, Justice Harry A. Blackmun's struggle to preserve the
right to abortion he had articulated for the Supreme Court two decades ear-
lier was headed for bitter failure. Five justices had voted in a closed-door
conference to uphold provisions in a restrictive Pennsylvania abortion law.
Roe v. Wade was in peril.
Id.
36. The Court struck down a provision that required a married woman to notify
her husband before obtaining an abortion. The district court had held all of the chal-
lenged provisions unconstitutional except for some of the reporting and recordkeep-
ing requirements and a provision requiring the physician to make an accurate
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held a requirement that a woman receive state-mandated
information designed to dissuade her from having an abortion and
then wait twenty-four hours before obtaining the abortion.37 The
joint opinion could reach this result only by overruling parts of two
earlier decisions in which the Court had struck similar regulations
under Roe's strict scrutiny analysis.38
How did the Justices manage to uphold all of these restrictions
while "reaffirming" Roe? They did so first by radically revising
Roe's "essential holding."' 39 Roe established the following frame-
work for evaluating abortion restrictions: 1) in the first trimester,
the state may not regulate abortion, but instead must leave "the
abortion decision and its effectuation. . . to the medical judgment
of the pregnant woman's attending physician"; 2) after the first tri-
mester, the state can regulate the abortion procedure, but only in
ways "reasonably related to maternal health"; 3) after viability,
"the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion," so long
as it provides exceptions to protect the woman's life and health.40
The Casey joint opinion redefined Roe's holding as comprising
three parts: 1) a recognition of the woman's right to choose an
abortion before viability and to obtain it "without undue interfer-
ence" from the state; 2) a confirmation of the government's power
to restrict abortions after fetal viability, provided such restrictions
contain exceptions "for pregnancies which endanger the woman's
life or health"; and 3) a recognition that the government has "legit-
imate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the
health of the woman and the life of the fetus. 41
This construction diverged significantly from Roe's framework.
Although Roe had generally acknowledged the state's "important
and legitimate" interest in the fetus, Justice Blackmun was careful
to recognize that interest as compelling only after viability.42 Be-
diagnosis of gestational age. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1396
(E.D. Pa. 1990). The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, uphold-
ing all provisions but the husband-notification requirement. Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 719 (3d. Cir. 1991).
37. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
38. Id. at 870 (overruling in part Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gy-
necologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1986) and City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983)).
39. Id. at 873.
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added). The Justices wrote for the majority
in this part of the joint opinion.
42. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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cause the Roe Court had established that the right to abortion was
a fundamental right, the state could infringe the right only to fur-
ther a compelling state interest.43 The Casey joint opinion, by as-
serting that the state had an interest in "protecting ... the life of
the fetus" throughout pregnancy, 44 positioned itself to permit pre-
viability restrictions having nothing to do with women's health, re-
strictions that would have been invalid under Roe. Moreover, once
it opened the door to such restrictions, the Casey joint opinion
faced the question how to balance the state's newly enhanced fetal
interest against the woman's interest in the abortion. The opinion's
reference to "undue interference '4" in the first prong of its Roe
restatement, foreshadowed its adoption of the undue burden stan-
dard,46 Casey's answer to the balancing question.
The joint opinion's authors, having modified Roe's holding, now
went further, openly "reject[ing] the trimester framework" as 1)
"misconceiv[ing] the nature of the pregnant woman's interest" and
2) "undervalu[ing] the State's interest in potential life."' 47 The Jus-
tices corrected Roe's first "flaw" by adopting the "undue burden"
standard.48 They corrected the second by allowing the state to ad-
vance its interest in the fetus even before viability, subject to the
undue burden test.49
These changes were far more than modest adjustments to Roe.
Rather, they altered the very nature of the abortion right, de-
moting it from a fundamental right to something more enigmatic
and certainly more fragile. Casey's standard lacks content, which
makes it both difficult to apply and susceptible to manipulation.
This in turn has rendered the right far more vulnerable to ero-
sion.50 Moreover, allowing the state to enact pre-viability restric-
tions based on fetal welfare5 ' rather than the woman's health
43. See id.
44. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 874-75 (describing the undue burden standard).
47. Id. at 873. Justices Blackmun and Stevens did not join this part of the joint
opinion.
48. See id. at 874.
49. See id. at 876.
50. See Sabina Zenkick, X Marks the Spot While Casey Strikes Out: Two Contro-
versial Abortion Decisions, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (1993).
51. Casey appeared to recognize only the state's interests in the woman's health
and in the fetus (or in "potential life"). As discussed below, Justice Kennedy (an
author of Casey's joint opinion) in Carhart identified a far broader array of permissi-
ble state interests, some having little or no relation to the fetus. For simplicity, I refer
primarily in this article to the state's interest in the fetus, although the state's motiva-
tion for passing an abortion restriction, while couched in terms of fetal welfare, is
2004]
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meant that the Court had to extend Roe's health exception into the
pre-viability period, a development that has sowed additional con-
fusion. Below I discuss the major problems with the undue burden
standard, with the expansion of the state's fetal interest, and with
the health exception requirement.
A. The Undue Burden Standard
The joint opinion in Casey substituted the "undue burden" stan-
dard for the strict scrutiny analysis required for all pre-viability
abortion restrictions under Roe.52 According to the joint opinion,
the Roe framework "misconceived the nature of the pregnant wo-
man's interest" before viability by construing the interest as too
absolute.53 The Justices asserted that "[o]nly where state regula-
tion imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.- 54
Although Justice O'Connor in several earlier opinions had advo-
cated adopting an "undue burden" standard,55 she and her col-
leagues articulated a new formulation of the standard in Casey. "A
finding of an undue burden," the joint opinion explained, "is a
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the pur-
pose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a wo-
man seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. '56 The Justices
apparently saw the malleability of their own standard, acknowledg-
ing that past opinions and different Justices had applied it "in ways
that could be considered inconsistent. ' 57 Their attempt to eluci-
date the test, however, offered no method or standards by which to
determine what constitutes a "substantial obstacle." Instead, the
joint opinion's explanation was conspicuously question-begging:
"In our considered judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitu-
often motivated more by animus toward the woman. See Caitlin Borgmann & Cathe-
rine Weiss, Beyond Apocalypse and Apology: A Moral Defense of Abortion, 35 PERSP.
ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 40, 42 (2003) (discussing how interests underlying
abortion restrictions often have more to do with oppressing women than protecting
their fetuses).
52. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77.
53. Id. at 873.
54. Id. at 874.
55. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989); Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986); City of Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983).
56. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
57. Id. at 876.
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tional burden. ' 58 "Understood another way," the Justices tried
again, "we answer the question.., whether a law designed to fur-
ther the State's interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden
on the woman's decision before fetal viability could be constitu-
tional. The answer is no. '59 Justice Scalia, in a scathing dissent,
fumed that "the [undue burden] standard is inherently manipulable
and will prove hopelessly unworkable in practice. '60 "Consciously
or not," Scalia charged, "the joint opinion's verbal shell game will
conceal raw judicial policy choices concerning what is 'appropriate'
abortion legislation. 61
Indeed, the joint opinion's determinations in Casey about which
restrictions were permissible seemed to reflect little more than the
Justices' own views as to which kinds of burdens were acceptable.
The Justices appeared determined to uphold a state-directed infor-
mation and twenty-four-hour waiting period requirement, even in
the face of extensive proof that it burdened the abortion decisions
of many women and increased the risks to their health.62 For ex-
ample, the district court found that the requirement, which de-
manded two separate visits to the clinic, would increase women's
exposure to the harassment and hostility of anti-choice protestors
and could delay abortions by up to two weeks, greatly raising the
overall costs of the abortion and "making the procedure more dan-
gerous medically."'63 The Justices also upheld a requirement that
58. Id. at 877.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 986 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 987.
62. Id. at 886 (joint opinion) (noting district court's findings that waiting period
did not further state's interest in women's health and that it increased the costs and
"risk of delay" of abortions); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp.
1323, 1351-52, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (issuing extensive findings of fact documenting
waiting period's burdens). Justice Blackmun, dissenting from the trio's upholding of
the waiting period provision, optimistically forecasted that the requirement would, "in
the future," be proven to impose an undue burden. Casey, 505 U.S. at 926, 938 n.9
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That prediction proved
false. On remand, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion to reopen the record
and accept further evidence that the challenged provisions, including the waiting pe-
riod, violated the newly established undue burden standard. Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 822 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the
Supreme Court's mandate precluded the reopening of the record. Casey v. Planned
Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 863 (3d Cir. 1994). On motion for a stay of the Third Cir-
cuit's mandate, Justice Souter, sitting as Circuit Justice, agreed with the Third Cir-
cuit's interpretation and denied a stay. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309,
1312-13 (1994). The Supreme Court's mandate did not preclude an as-applied chal-
lenge once the law took effect, but no such challenge followed, and the provision
remains in effect today.
63. Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1351-52.
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minors get their parents' consent or go to court to seek a judge's
permission (a procedure known as a "judicial bypass") before ob-
taining an abortion. On the other hand, they struck down a re-
quirement that married women notify their husbands of their
intention to obtain an abortion.
The joint opinion seemed to reach these disparate conclusions by
construing as "substantial obstacles" only those burdens that it
viewed as tantamount to a ban on abortions.64 Thus, for example,
the Justices "disagree[d] with the District Court's conclusion that
the 'particularly burdensome' effects of the waiting period on some
women require[d] its invalidation."65 The Justices, unlike the dis-
trict court, were "not convinced" that the delays and increased
costs and health risks imposed by "the 24-hour waiting period con-
stitute[ ] an undue burden. ' 66 On the other hand, they found that
the husband-notification requirement was "likely to prevent a sig-
nificant number of women from obtaining an abortion.... We must
not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant number of wo-
men [abused by their husbands] ... are likely to be deterred from
procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had out-
lawed abortion in all cases."67 The Justices concluded that this bur-
den was "an undue burden, and therefore invalid." 68
In order to determine that the husband-notification requirement
effectively amounted to a ban, whereas the parental consent re-
quirement did not, the Justices manipulated the undue burden test
64. The joint opinion's enunciation of the undue burden test seemed to indicate
that the threshold was not this high. For example, the opinion did not adopt Justice
O'Connor's earlier formulations of the standard, in which she characterized an "un-
due burden" as one that "involve[s] absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the
abortion decision." City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 464 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). But the joint opinion's
application of the undue burden test to the specific restrictions at issue in Casey re-
vealed the Justices' willingness to accept provisions that imposed heavy burdens, as
long as the Justices did not view these burdens as absolute barriers.
65. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886-87.
66. Id. at 887 (emphasis added). The opinion faulted the district court for "not
conclud[ing] that the waiting period is [a substantial] obstacle." Id. In fact, the dis-
trict court catalogued the information and waiting period requirements' numerous
and troubling effects and held these burdens unconstitutional. The court can hardly
be taken to task for failing to utter the magic words "substantial obstacle" or "undue
burden," when these standards were first announced and made controlling in Casey
itself. Cf. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
760-62 (1986) (striking down state-mandated information requirement); City of Ak-
ron, 462 U.S. at 449-51 (striking down state-mandated information and waiting period
law).
67. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-94 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 895.
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and ignored the district court's findings of fact about the parental
consent provision's effects on minors. They manipulated the un-
due burden test by tinkering with the relevant pool of women to be
considered in assessing the burdensomeness of each restriction. In
assessing the husband-notification provision, the Court explained:
The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon
whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is mea-
sured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on
those whose conduct it affects .... The proper focus of constitu-
tional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not
the group for whom the law is irrelevant.69
But the Justices provided little guidance for how to determine
when, or for whom, a law operates as "a restriction," and indeed
they appeared to exploit that term's ambiguity by applying it in
seemingly inconsistent ways to different provisions.
In evaluating the husband-notification provision, for example,
the Justices made clear that the relevant pool was not all women
seeking abortions. If that were true, the provision would not im-
pose an undue burden, since the restriction "imposed almost no
burden at all for the vast majority of women seeking abortions."7
Nor did the Court assess the law's burden on all married women
seeking abortions, despite the fact that the law required a married
woman seeking an abortion to produce a "signed statement.., that
she has notified her spouse that she is about to undergo an abor-
tion."' 71 Rather, the Court looked only at married women who
were unwilling to notify their husbands. But even among that pool,
the Court disregarded those women who qualified for a statutory
exemption, although a woman invoking an exemption was required
to certify such potentially embarrassing or humiliating private facts
as "that her husband is not the man who impregnated her; that her
husband could not be located; that her pregnancy is the result of
spousal sexual assault... ; or that [she] believes that notifying her
husband will cause him or someone else to inflict bodily injury
upon her."'72
Instead, the Court deemed the husband-notification provision to
operate as "a restriction" only upon "married women seeking
abortions who do not wish to notify their husbands of their inten-
69. Id. at 894.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 887.
72. Id.; see also id. at 908-09 (appendix to joint opinion, quoting 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 3209(b) (1989)).
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tions and who do not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions to
the notice requirement."73 Acknowledging the widespread problem
of family violence, the Court concluded that women with abusive
husbands would sooner forego an abortion than notify their hus-
band of their intent to end a pregnancy.74 For these women, the
requirement did not "merely make abortions a little more difficult
or expensive to obtain" but instead was likely to prevent them
from obtaining an abortion altogether and therefore imposed an
undue burden.7 5 The Court's definition of the relevant pool in as-
sessing the husband-notification provision thus seemed to prede-
termine the result the Court reached. Had the Court been inclined
to uphold the requirement, it simply could have defined the pool
differently, to include those women for whom the requirement im-
posed burdens short of an insurmountable obstacle.
In examining the parental consent measure, the Justices defined
the relevant pool more broadly, taking into account the law's ef-
fects on teenagers who would benefit from the requirement. Thus,
the joint opinion justified its different treatment of the husband-
notification and the parental consent requirements as "based on
the quite reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from con-
sultation with their parents. '76 But teenagers will only benefit in
this way if they can be convinced to talk to their parents. As the
district court in Casey found, "[s]ome [teenagers] may lie about
their age to attempt to avoid the [parental consent] requirements;
others may decide to carry their pregnancy to term; and some may
resort to self-abortion. ' 77 Moreover, the notion that all teenagers
will benefit from parental consultation is simply false.7 8 The joint
opinion implicitly acknowledged as much when it emphasized the
73. Id. at 895 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 888-94.
75. Id. at 893-94.
76. Id. at 895.
77. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1357 (1990); see Aida Torres
et al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and
Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284, 288 (1980) (describing research showing
that many teenagers will resort to desperate measures to avoid telling their parents
about a pregnancy and planned abortion); see also Council Report, Mandatory Paren-
tal Consent to Abortion, 269 JAMA 82, 83 (1993) (same).
78. See Stanley K. Henshaw & Kathryn Post, Parental Involvement in Minors'
Abortion Decisions, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 194, 204 & tbl. 7 (1992) (finding that a
majority of minors whose parents found out about pregnancy without being volunta-
rily told by the minor reported adverse consequences, including at least six percent
who reported being beaten, being forced to leave home, or having their parents'
health affected).
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problem of family violence in its discussion of the husband-notifi-
cation measure.
The district court further construed the parental consent provi-
sion as mandating parental informed consent, requiring parents to
make in-person visits to the clinic before the abortion could be per-
formed.7 9 Thus, the district court found, even a minor whose par-
ents consented to the procedure might find her access to abortion
delayed or obstructed, if her parents were unable or unwilling to
visit the clinic in person.8 ° In view of all these obstacles, the district
court found that the parental consent provisions "would unduly
burden a minor woman's ability to get an abortion" and that "the
provisions may act in such a way as to deprive [a teenager] of her
right to have an abortion.""l
Nevertheless, the Justices overlooked or ignored these findings
of fact82 and contemplated a pool of minors who would consult
their parents in the face of the parental consent law and who would
benefit from the law's requirements. If the Justices had wanted to
invalidate the parental consent provision, they could have assessed
the provision's burdens on those minors who would not or could
not comply with the law's provisions and who would thereby be
deterred or prevented from obtaining an abortion. For these mi-
nors, the provision would effectively amount to a ban as surely as it
would for abused married women and thus would meet the Jus-
tices' apparently high threshold for a "substantial obstacle."83
The joint opinion's conclusions about what kinds of burdens are
permissible demonstrates the high threshold set by the undue bur-
79. Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1383-84.
80. Id. at 1357.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. In contrast, the Justices quoted several pages of the district court's findings on
the burdens of the husband-notification requirement. See Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888-91 (1992).
83. It is no surprise that the Justices upheld the parental notice law. Parental in-
volvement requirements, with sufficient bypass mechanisms, had been deemed consti-
tutional long before Casey was decided and the joint opinion, noting this, gave scant
attention to this particular provision. See id. at 899-900. But the joint opinion in
Casey was forging a new legal test. Its application of the undue burden test to the
state-directed information and waiting period requirement necessitated overruling the
otherwise-controlling Supreme Court precedents. See supra note 38 and accompany-
ing text. Accordingly, the Justices should have explained how the newly minted un-
due burden test applied to a parental consent provision and why that test should allow
the provision to stand, notwithstanding the Justices' seemingly contradictory ruling on
husband notification. Their failure to do so is particularly inexcusable in light of the
district court's findings of fact establishing the dangerous burdens the provision
imposed.
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den test-the only burdens clearly invalid under Casey are those
equivalent to a ban on abortion-and raises the prospect that
judges can manipulate the test, at least in certain cases, to predeter-
mine whether a restriction effectively functions as a ban. But the
manner in which the Justices administered the undue burden test in
Casey highlights an additional, critical problem: the test's indiffer-
ence to the cumulative burdens that multiple restrictions impose.
The joint opinion addressed the challenged provisions seriatim, ap-
plying the undue burden standard to each. It examined how oner-
ous each restriction was as if no other restrictions existed, ignoring
how a woman would fare under the mounting obstacles as the
Court upheld restriction upon restriction.84 Thus, under Casey, a
single provision may not place a substantial obstacle in a woman's
path to abortion. A state can, and many do, accomplish the same
result, however, by erecting separate hurdles that cumulatively
amount to what is surely a "substantial" obstacle for many wo-
men.85 Indeed, state legislatures consider and pass an ever-increas-
ing number of anti-choice restrictions each year, no doubt at least
partly because they are emboldened by the undue burden stan-
dard's leniency.86
The undue burden test is thus both too devoid of content and, as
applied in Casey, too tolerant of restrictions short of a ban to pro-
tect adequately a woman's ability to exercise her right to abortion
"free from the coercive and brooding influence of the State. 87
84. In Casey, the cumulative burdens of the approved provisions were left to fall
most heavily on minors, especially those who cannot consult with their parents and
who live far from an abortion provider. Such minors first have to seek a judge's per-
mission to allow them to get the abortion without telling their parents. They then
have to make two trips to the distant clinic, one to obtain the state-mandated informa-
tion and a second, at least twenty-four hours later, for the abortion. Since teens often
fail initially to recognize or acknowledge a pregnancy, these minors may be far ad-
vanced in pregnancy by the time they have overcome all the obstacles, thereby in-
creasing the risks to their health and the amount of money they must raise to finance
the abortion. To secretly accomplish negotiating absences from school and finding
transportation is surely an insurmountable burden to many teens who would other-
wise seek to end their pregnancies. See generally Stanley K. Henshaw, Factors Hin-
dering Access to Abortion Services, 27 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 54 (1995).
85. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, WHO DECIDES? A STATE-BY-STATE RE-
PORT ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (2004), available at http://
www.naral.org/yourstate/whodecides/index.cfm.
86. State legislatures considered 558 anti-choice measures in 2003 alone (a thirty-
five percent increase over 2002, and they enacted forty-five anti-choice measures in
2003 a thirty-two percent increase from 2002). Id. at http://www.naral.org/yourstate/
whodecides/trends/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=10083.
87. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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The joint opinion's authors seemed satisfied that they had suffi-
ciently preserved "the essential holding of Roe' 88 by ensuring that
states could not directly or indirectly prevent women from
"mak[ing] the ultimate decision" 9 whether to end a pregnancy
before viability. But, through restrictions such as state-directed in-
formation mandates and waiting periods, parental involvement re-
quirements, and other onerous measures,90 states have succeeded
in making it extremely burdensome for women to obtain abor-
tions.91 Moreover, as individually permissible burdens pile up, they
can together create insurmountable obstacles for some women, a
problem to which Casey provides no answer.
B. The State's Interest in Fetal Welfare
Casey's significant departures from Roe, including the undue
burden standard, stem from the joint opinion's enhanced regard
for the state's interest in the fetus. The state's fetal interest had
been recognized in Roe but regarded as "compelling" only after
fetal viability.92 Casey established that this interest could justify
state regulation of abortion from the earliest stages of pregnancy.93
The joint opinion stated, "The woman's liberty is not so unlimited,
however, that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for
the life of the unborn . . . ."94 With this modification, the Justices
ran headlong into the most vexing aspect of the abortion rights
constitutional conundrum: how to balance the woman's liberty in-
88. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
89. Id. at 877.
90. See, e.g., CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, TARGETED REGULATION OF ABORTION
PROVIDERS (TRAP): AVOIDING THE TRAP (Aug. 2003) (regarding onerous and dis-
criminatory abortion facility regulations), available at http://www.crlp.org/pub fac-tra
p.html; Am. Civil Liberties Union, Public Funding for Abortion Map, at http://www.
aclu.org/ReproductiveRights/ReproductiveRights.cfm?ID=11617&c=146 (Jan. 15,
2003) (regarding bans on publicly funded abortions).
91. See generally NARAL Pro-Choice America, Access to Abortion, at http://
www.nara I.org/Issues/access/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); see also Henshaw,
supra note 84.
92. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
94. Id. (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor earlier had advocated recognizing the
state's fetal interest as "compelling" throughout pregnancy, but the joint opinion took
pains not to invoke that word; instead, it characterized the state's interest as "legiti-
mate," "important," and "substantial." See, e.g., id. at 871, 876. Under the strict scru-
tiny standard, a fundamental right cannot be infringed unless the state's interest is
compelling. By allowing the state to burden the abortion decision for less-than-com-
pelling reasons, the joint opinion signaled that it did not consider the constitutional
right to abortion to be fundamental.
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terest in terminating her pregnancy against a state's asserted inter-
est in the fetus.
In contrast, Roe's much-disparaged "trimester" framework95 had
minimized the relevant sphere of this quandary. When Roe held
that the state's interest in the fetus did not become "compelling"
until after viability,96 it ensured that the woman's liberty interest
would face off against the state's fetal interest only with respect to
exceedingly rare, post-viability abortions.97 Restrictions designed
to further the state's interest in potential life were permissible, with
exceptions to preserve a woman's life and health, only for the min-
ute percentage of abortions performed after fetal viability, not for
those performed earlier.98
The Casey majority expounded at length on the "soundness" of
Roe's protection of a woman's liberty interest in abortion. 99 But it
struck directly at the heart of this interest when it repudiated Roe's
declaration that the state could advance its countervailing interest
in the fetus only after viability.100 The strength of the state's inter-
est in fetal welfare is inversely proportional to that of the woman's
liberty °10 The Court could not expand Roe's recognition of the
state's interest in the fetus into the pre-viability stage without plac-
ing the woman's liberty fundamentally at risk. Indeed, the Casey
joint opinion acknowledged that Roe's "trimester framework no
doubt was erected to ensure that the woman's right to choose not
95. In fact, Roe's framework did not exactly track the trimesters of pregnancy.
The Court permitted abortions to be restricted or banned after fetal viability, a line
which the Court noted occurred roughly at seven months (twenty-eight weeks) of
pregnancy, but which it admitted could occur as early as twenty-four weeks. See Roe,
410 U.S. at 160.
96. See id. at 163-65.
97. In 2000, approximately 1.4% of abortions were performed at twenty-one
weeks of gestation or later. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Abortion
Surveillance-United States, 2000, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY, Nov. 28, 2003,
at http://www.cd c.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5212al.htm. Fetal viability nor-
mally does not occur until at least twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.
98. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-65. In reality, increased solicitude toward the state's
pre-viability interest in potential life crept into some of the Court's abortion decisions
long before Casey. See infra text accompanying notes 111-14 and note 125.
99. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857-62.
100. See id. at 846 (finding that "the State has legitimate interests from the outset of
the pregnancy in protecting ... the life of the fetus").
101. The state's fetal interest is thus not akin to other compelling governmental
interests that may, from time to time, override fundamental constitutional rights. The
government's interest in public safety, for example, may outweigh the right to free
speech in certain instances. But, outside these limited circumstances, there is nothing
inherently at odds between the interest in public safety and the right to free speech.
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become so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal life
that her choice exists in theory but not in fact.
102
Apparently recognizing the hornets' nest into which they had
stumbled, the joint opinion's authors attempted a fast exit, adding
that "the means chosen by the State to further the interest in po-
tential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice,
not hinder it."1 0 3  The opinion called permissible those
"[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural mecha-
nism by which the State ... may express profound respect for the
life of the unborn." 104 It indicated that laws with a "valid purpose"
were those "not designed to strike at the right itself. ' 10 5 The Casey
joint opinion thus initially appeared to balance the state's and the
woman's competing interests in the pre-viability stage largely in the
woman's favor, permitting the state to do little more than commu-
nicate its preference for childbirth. Not surprisingly, however, the
joint opinion failed to rein in the conflict it set up between the
state's and the woman's interests in the pre-viability stage.
State-mandated information laws and waiting periods would
seem to be the prototypical example of what the Casey joint opin-
ion considered a permissible pre-viability law enacted to further
the state's interest in the fetus. The opinion described Penn-
sylvania's state-directed information and waiting period law as
"legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and in-
formed, . . . [while] express[ing] a preference for childbirth over
abortion. 1 0 6 But was the law merely meant to "inform the wo-
man's free choice" or was it "calculated to hinder" the woman's
decision? The Justices assumed the former, but it is unclear upon
what they based their assumption, especially given the district
court's extensive findings documenting the burdens that the re-
quirement imposed. And if the Justices' assumption was wrong,
what kind of proof could the plaintiffs have produced to establish
the law's impermissible intent?
1 0 7
102. Id. at 872.
103. Id. at 877. Moreover, the joint opinion said, "a statute which, while furthering
the interest in potential life ... has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its
legitimate ends." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 874.
106. Id. at 883, 885.
107. Establishing such intent to the Court's satisfaction has proven virtually impos-
sible in practice. Compare, e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 971 (1997) (per
curiam) (finding no basis for concluding that physician-only abortion law's purpose
was to interfere with the right to abortion), with Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 (Stevens, J.,
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In fact, there is no meaningful distinction between a fetal-inter-
est-furthering law intended to make abortions harder to obtain and
one intended to promote the state's preference for childbirth over
abortion. The goals are too interrelated and too likely furthered by
the same pieces of legislation. Justice Scalia was frank about the
underlying goals of laws enacted to further the state's interest in
potential life. Disputing that such a law would ever be "calculated
to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it," Scalia remarked,
"Any regulation of abortion that is intended to advance what the
joint opinion concedes is the State's 'substantial' interest in pro-
tecting unborn life will be 'calculated to hinder' a decision to have
an abortion.' 0 8
The joint opinion explained that a statute that permissibly fur-
thers the state's fetal interest-i.e., one that is not designed to hin-
der the woman's right to abortion-may nevertheless impose such
a hindrance as long as the resulting burden is not undue. The opin-
ion stated that a law serving a legitimate purpose that "has the inci-
dental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it."'1 9 Indeed
joint opinion went on to uphold the waiting period in Casey, even
though the law was not intended to promote women's health and
imposed considerable burdens on women seeking abortions.
dissenting) ("When one looks at the totality of circumstances surrounding the legisla-
tion, there is evidence from which one could conclude that the legislature's predomi-
nant motive was to make abortions more difficult." (citation omitted)). Moreover,
Mazurek calls into question whether an improper purpose alone could ever suffice to
invalidate an abortion restriction. See id. at 972 (majority opinion) (questioning
Court of Appeals' assumption that "a legislative purpose to interfere with the consti-
tutionally protected right to abortion without the effect of interfering with that
right... could render [a] law invalid"). This is so notwithstanding Casey's description
of an undue burden as one whose "purpose or effect" is to impose a substantial obsta-
cle. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added).
108. Casey, 505 U.S. at 986-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At the margins, one can im-
agine restrictions designed to further the state's fetal interest and not to hinder abor-
tion (although surely these would be ultimately unsatisfactory to opponents of the
right to abortion). For example, a state might require a second doctor to be present
during abortions in which the fetus might be viable, in order to provide medical care
should the fetus be born alive. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists, 476 U.S. 747, 770-71 (1986). Or the state might, in the interests of preserv-
ing the dignity of the fetus, prohibit procedures that are more gruesome than other
available methods. Where the fetus is viable, the state might require the doctor to use
the procedure most likely to produce a live birth. The state could also require the
fetus to be anaesthetized before any abortion performed late in pregnancy. In the
current state of medicine, however, all such measures would increase the health risks
to the pregnant woman and would, therefore, hinder the right to abortion as a matter
of fact.
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
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Casey's decision to open the door to pre-viability restrictions that
promote the state's interest in the fetus thus granted the state far
broader latitude than it had under Roe to enact measures that hin-
der a woman's access to abortion throughout pregnancy.
In fact, the Court had begun to show some solicitude toward the
state's pre-viability interest in the fetus long before Casey was de-
cided. Four years after Roe, the Court decided that a state need
not fund abortions for low-income women within a program that
paid for the costs of prenatal care and childbirth because Roe "im-
plies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judg-
ment favoring childbirth over abortion."110 In a later funding case,
Justice Blackmun decried the Court's toleration of restrictions in-
tended neither to make abortion safer nor to "inform" the wo-
man's decision but to hinder a woman's access to abortion:
While technically leaving intact the fundamental right protected
by Roe v. Wade, the Court, "through a relentlessly formalistic
catechism," once again has rendered the right's substance nuga-
tory. This is a course nearly as noxious as overruling Roe di-
rectly, for if a right is found to be unenforceable, even against
flagrant attempts by government to circumvent it, then it ceases to
be a right at all."1
In the abortion funding cases, however, the Court took pains to
distinguish funding prohibitions from laws that affirmatively inter-
fere with the right to abortion, calling the funding limitations "dif-
ferent in kind" from direct restrictions impermissible under Roe.'1 2
The Court emphasized that in a funding prohibition the state
"places no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant wo-
man's path to an abortion.""' 3 The Casey joint opinion went a step
110. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). Maher addressed government-funded
elective abortions but the Court later extended its holding to medically necessary
abortions. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (holding that "a State that
participates in the Medicaid program is not obligated ... to continue to fund those
medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under
the Hyde Amendment," and that such funding restrictions do not violate the federal
Constitution).
111. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 220 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted and emphasis added).
112. Harris, 448 U.S. at 314.
113. As the dissenting Justices forcefully argued, the Court's distinction between
bans on publicly funded abortions and affirmative interference with abortion is a
hollow one. Funding bans exert a coercive effect that steers indigent women away
from abortions. See, e.g., id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that "both by
design and in effect [denial of public funds for abortions] serves to coerce indigent
pregnant women to bear children that they would otherwise elect not to have");
Maher, 432 U.S. at 482-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting a similar proposition);
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further. The opinion held that the Constitution permits direct re-
strictions on pre-viability abortions to be based solely on a state's
interest in protecting the fetus. In doing so, the opinion weakened
Roe's foundation more openly and directly.
Casey may be blamed for officially inviting the state and its inter-
est in the fetus into the constitutional conversation about pre-via-
bility abortions; in a sense, though, Justice Blackmun himself may
inadvertently have opened the door. Although his opinion in Roe
established the right to abortion as a fundamental constitutional
right, it was, as many have observed, oddly taciturn when it came
to addressing the importance of reproductive autonomy in wo-
men's lives.114 Blackmun offered a single, scant, almost perfunc-
tory paragraph on the effects of abortion bans on women,
describing the bans' "detriment" in a detached, passive voice:
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring,
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psycho-
logical harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may
be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all con-
cerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psycho-
logically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases . . . the
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed mother-
hood may be involved.1"5
At the same time, the opinion was exceptionally deferential to phy-
sicians, often describing the right to abortion as though it belonged
solely to the doctor:
The [Court's] decision vindicates the right of the physician to
administer medical treatment according to his professional judg-
ment .... Up to [the points at which the state's interests are
compelling,] the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently,
and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it
must rest with the physician. 16
see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, &
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 230-36 (1997).
114. See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 4, at 613-15 (describing various commentators'
criticisms of Roe for focusing insufficiently on women's individual liberty).
115. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
116. Id. at 164-66. In a later abortion decision, Justice White accused Blackmun of
seeming to recognize a physician's constitutional right to determine how to practice
medicine, claiming that Blackmun's discussion "smack[ed] of economic due process
rights for physicians." Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 802-04 (1986); cf. id. at 762. Justice Blackmun's background before becom-
ing a judge may well account in part for his solicitude toward the medical profession:
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Roe's failure to focus on the importance of abortion to women thus
left women disconcertingly out of the debate from the very begin-
ning. The opinion's relative silence on that score may have unwit-
tingly invited, or at least failed to provide an adequate backstop
against, a growing consideration for the state's countervailing inter-
est in the fetus.117
Ironically, the joint opinion in Casey strongly, even passionately,
articulated a woman-centered, equality-based argument for up-
holding the right to abortion, firmly grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 Casey thus tantalizingly
positioned the majority to reaffirm, without modifying, Roe, but in
a doctrinally sounder fashion. "This opinion makes sense and puts
the right to abortion on a firmer jurisprudential foundation than
ever before," Professor Laurence H. Tribe optimistically declared
shortly after the Court issued its decision. 119 Despite their rhetoric,
however, the opinion's authors simply were not prepared to accord
the right to abortion the same level of protection Blackmun had
given it in Roe, and their solicitude toward the state's fetal interest
was the proof.
He anguished over whether to become a doctor or a lawyer. Having opted for the
latter, he later served for nine years as the first resident counsel to the Mayo Clinic
and the Mayo Association in Rochester, Minnesota. As a Supreme Court Justice, he
was often the author of opinions that shaped medical practice. See Larry Gostin,
Guest Editor's Introduction, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 153, 153 (1987).
117. Blackmun's conception of the abortion right appears to have evolved over
time. For example, his fervent dissent in Webster forthrightly addressed the impor-
tance of reproductive freedom to women:
[T]he plurality.., casts into darkness the hopes and visions of every woman
in this country who had come to believe that the Constitution guaranteed
her the right to exercise some control over her unique ability to bear chil-
dren. The plurality does so either oblivious or insensitive to the fact that
millions of women, and their families, have ordered their lives around the
right to reproductive choice, and that this right has become vital to the full
participation of women in the economic and political walks of American life.
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 557 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992), arguing that:
[A woman's] suffering [in pregnancy and childbirth] is too intimate and per-
sonal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the wo-
man's role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our
history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large
extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.
119. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Telling Court Opinion, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 1992, at Al.
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C. The Health Exception Requirement
Casey's articulation and application of Roe's health exception re-
quirement did not fully blunt the harms the Court invited by al-
lowing pre-viability restrictions based on the state's fetal interest.
Although Casey read Roe's health exception as applying to the pre-
viability period, the opinion did not foreclose the possibility that
the Court would tolerate some unspecified level of risk to a wo-
man's health.
In Roe, the Court established the requirement that all post-via-
bility abortion restrictions must include exceptions for when a wo-
man's health or life is at stake: "For the stage subsequent to
viability, the State ... may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medi-
cal judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.' 120 This directive appears to state that, when a woman
needs a post-viability abortion because her life or health is at risk
(i.e. in a risky pregnancy), the state must waive both a ban and any
regulation short of a ban. The corollary of this reading is that bans
or restrictions on elective post-viability abortions are permitted.
The quoted language thus assumes a situation in which the wo-
man's own pregnancy poses the risk that is to be alleviated by the
health exception.
Roe did not address whether abortion restrictions must contain
exceptions even for healthy pregnancies where the restriction itself
increases a woman's medical risks, such as by delaying her abortion
or forcing her doctor to use a more dangerous procedure. The
Court did not have to confront this latter question because Roe's
health exception requirement, on its face, applied only to post-via-
bility restrictions. 12 Before Casey, Roe's health exception require-
ment was rarely invoked with respect to pre-viability restrictions
because, under Roe's framework, the state could regulate abortions
before viability only to promote the woman's health. 122 Stated an-
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
121. Most states ban abortions after viability with exceptions only for women
whose life or health is at risk, so that in these states the only women who can obtain
post-viability abortions are by definition ill or dying. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE
AMERICA, OVERVIEW OF STATE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS LAWS 3 (2003), available at
http://www.naral.org/your state/whodecides/trends/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/se-
curity/getfile.cfm&PageID=10085. Even absent a post-viability ban, only a tiny per-
centage of women seek post-viability abortions, and virtually none of these women
have healthy pregnancies. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note
97.
122. In a significant exception to the general rule laid out in Roe, the Court permit-
ted certain parental involvement requirements long before Casey, although these re-
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other way, in pre-viability restrictions the state's and the woman's
interests were by definition aligned. The need for a life and health
exception arose after viability because, at this stage of pregnancy,
the state was permitted to act in furtherance of its interest in fetal
welfare, an interest separate from and potentially in conflict with
the woman's well-being.
Nevertheless, in an early post-Roe decision, the Court invali-
dated a pre-viability restriction because of the increased health
risks it imposed on all women seeking second-trimester abortions.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, the Court struck down a pro-
cedure ban that applied before viability on the grounds that it
"force[d] a woman and her physician to terminate her pregnancy
by methods more dangerous to her health than the method out-
lawed. '123 Other pre-Casey decisions echoed Danforth's rejection
of state-imposed health risks on women. In Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,124 the Court held that
an abortion restriction may not require a "trade-off" between a
woman's health and fetal survival or fail to allow "maternal health
[to] be the physician's paramount consideration.' 1 25 For example,
a state law requiring that a second doctor attend all post-viability
abortions in order to provide medical care to the fetus should it be
born alive must contain an exception for emergencies when the
quirements apply pre-viability and are justified on grounds distinct from an interest in
the woman's health. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450 (1990) (noting
that the "usual justification" for parental involvement provision is "assur[ing] that the
minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy is knowing, intelligent, and deliberate").
In at least two opinions, the Court hinted that any such requirement demands a medi-
cal emergency exception. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407 n.14 (1981)
("There is no authority for the view expressed in the dissent that the statute would
apply to 'minors with emergency health care needs.' . . . Appellant does not so con-
tend, and the Utah Supreme Court in this case took pains to say that time is of the
essence in an abortion decision." (citation omitted)); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
630 (1979) (including among "important aspects" of statute as construed by Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court that parental consent requirement is waived "when
the need for the abortion constitutes an emergency requiring immediate action" (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). But see Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 422 (noting without
discussion that parental notice statute, upheld by Court, contained exception only for
when "an immediate abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death" (emphasis
added)).
123. 428 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1976).
124. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
125. Id. at 768-69; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979) (invalidat-
ing Pennsylvania restriction that did "not clearly specify... that the woman's life and
health must always prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict" and
which may require physician to "make a 'trade-off' between the woman's health and
additional percentage points of fetal survival").
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second physician cannot be located in time. 26 Moreover, the
Court stressed the absolute primacy of women's health, tolerating
no measurable health increase to a woman. 127
Because Casey extended the reach of the state's fetal interest
into the pre-viability stage, the question whether Roe's health ex-
ception requirement also applied to the pre-viability stage became
pivotal. Casey held that it did, treating Roe's health exception re-
quirement as the sine qua non of abortion restrictions and sug-
gesting that the validity of all of the remaining restrictions at issue
in Casey depended upon the adequacy of the statute's medical
emergency exception. 128
Despite its strong reaffirmation of Roe's health exception re-
quirement, Casey left unanswered some questions about the re-
quirement. First, did the Justices understand the health exception
requirement to apply only to risky pregnancies? Or should it apply
even to healthy pregnancies when the abortion restriction itself
would increase the woman's health risks? The joint opinion did
not offer a definitive, unambiguous answer to this question. On
the one hand, Casey did not renounce the Court's earlier rulings in
which it had established the "no-trade-off" principle. 29 Indeed,
the question was not directly before the Court in Casey, since the
plaintiffs had not challenged the medical emergency exception
based on its failure to cover situations in which the restrictions im-
posed health risks on women with normal pregnancies. 130
126. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769-71 (finding a post-viability, second-physician
requirement unconstitutional for lack of medical emergency exception); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 484 n.8 (1983) (recognizing that post-
viability, second-physician requirement must contain an exception for the situation
where the health of the mother is endangered by delay in the arrival of the second
physician and finding such an exception implicit in the statute).
127. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-69.
128. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879-80 (1992). The health
exception at issue in Casey took the form of a medical emergency exception. See id.
at 879. The term "health exception" is normally used to refer to an exemption from a
ban on abortion or abortion procedures. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
930-31 (2000) (discussing need for "health exception" to ban on abortion procedure).
A "medical emergency exception," on the other hand, exempts a woman from restric-
tions short of a ban when an emergency situation exists. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 770 (requiring that a post-viability, second-physician requirement must con-
tain an emergency exception for "situation where the health of the mother [i]s endan-
gered by delay in the arrival of the second physician").
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130. The medical emergency exception was challenged on the basis that it was too
narrow and did not cover three serious health conditions (preeclampsia, inevitable
abortion, and premature ruptured membrane) that could require an immediate abor-
tion. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880. The joint opinion accepted the Court of Appeals' con-
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Nevertheless, it is troubling that the joint opinion was so un-
moved by the district court's findings that the waiting period and
parental involvement requirements imposed considerable health
risks even on healthy women.'31 The opinion asserted that the
medical emergency exception, as construed, sufficiently alleviated
the waiting period's harms. But the exception had been construed
only to apply to certain serious medical conditions arising in preg-
nancy. The opinion disregarded the risks from the substantial de-
lays that the waiting period would commonly cause.132 And the
Justices wholly ignored the district court's findings that the paren-
tal consent provision could delay or even block some teenagers'
access to abortion. 3 3 The joint opinion thus seemed to allow an
abortion restriction to impose some unspecified measure of risk on
healthy women, with no exception to alleviate that risk as long as
the statute included an exception for women with risky
pregnancies.
Second, Casey did not unambiguously hold that a health excep-
tion must protect a woman in the face of any measurably increased
risk. The opinion's discussion of the medical emergency exception
stated that the Court would be required to invalidate the exception
if "it foreclose[d] the possibility of an immediate abortion despite
some significant health risks."' 34 It is not clear what the Justices
meant by "significant" and whether they meant to leave open the
possibility that some, less serious risks might be permissible.135
Moreover, the opinion troublingly closed its discussion of the
medical emergency exception by concluding that "the medical
struction, which read the exception to encompass these conditions, and held the
provision constitutionally adequate. Id.
131. See id. at 885-86; see also supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
132. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86. See also Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1014 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) noting that:
Without question, there were women for whom the [waiting period] regula-
tion would impose some additional health risk who would not fall within the
medical emergency exception. The Court concluded, despite the certainty of
this increased risk, that there was no showing that the burden on any of the
women was substantial.
133. See supra notes 80-81.
134. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
135. In Thornburgh, the Court found that a health exception's reference to a "sig-
nificantly greater risk" suggested a higher level of risk than simply a "meaningfully
increased" risk. 476 U.S. 747,769 (1986). Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court,
arguing that "significantly greater risk" could "fairly be read to require only that the
risk be a real and identifiable one." Id. at 832 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted). She added, however, "I express no opinion as to the point
at which a 'trade-off' between the health of the woman and the survival of the fetus
would rise to the level of an undue burden." Id.
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emergency definition imposes no undue burden on a woman's abor-
tion right.' 1 36 That formulation seemed to subsume the medical
emergency exception within the undue burden test rather than
treating it as a separate, categorical requirement. If this were in-
deed what the opinion intended, a woman need only be excused
from compliance with a restriction if the risk to her health reached
a level that the Court would consider an undue burden.
The Court in Carhart resolved at least some of the uncertainty
left by Casey's discussion of the health exception requirement, clar-
ifying, for example, that the requirement is independent and not
subject to the undue burden test.137 Nevertheless, Casey's ambigu-
ous language in describing the health exception requirement and
the opinion's tolerance of certain health risks may encourage legis-
latures to experiment with what qualifiers a medical emergency ex-
ception could contain and still pass constitutional muster.
Il. STENBERG V. CARHART
Casey struck an ostensible compromise on the contentious abor-
tion issue by eliminating Roe's "trimester" framework and substi-
tuting the undue burden standard. The Justices pronounced this
compromise satisfactory because, on the one hand, it affirmed
Roe's "essential holding," and on the other, it gave states greater
leeway to regulate pre-viability abortions. 138 Energetically exploit-
ing the latitude that Casey granted them, anti-choice activists,
states legislatures, and more recently Congress have tested how
much restriction is permissible, annually passing a deluge of laws
interfering with abortion. 139 The "partial-birth abortion" bans are
a part of this tide.
Although the "partial-birth abortion" bans' proponents argue
that the procedure they claim to target is never medically necessary
and in fact is sometimes dangerous to women, 4 ° this has never
136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (emphasis added).
137. See infra Part III.
138. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
139. In 2003, states enacted forty-five anti-choice laws. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE
AMERICA FOUNDATION, supra note 85. Casey thus has not taken the heat off of the
state and lower federal courts, which must deal with the resulting litigation challeng-
ing these many restrictions. Moreover, due to the fact-intensive nature of the undue
burden test, these litigations often cannot be decided as a matter of law without the
need for a trial. See Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013,
1013 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing fact-intensive nature of undue
burden test).
140. See, e.g., Carhart v. Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914, 1015-16 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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been the professed motive for the bans.' 4' Rather, the bans aim to
highlight the grisly nature of abortion and the cruelty of abortion
procedures to fetuses. 142 Also, by drafting the bans with vague and
broad language that encompasses safe and common methods of
abortion, the bans' supporters aim to threaten access to abortions
generally.1 43 Under Roe, bans with such a purpose would have
been automatically impermissible. a4 4  Casey, however, officially
sanctioned previability abortion restrictions that do not even pre-
tend to be about advancing a woman's health or wellbeing as long
as these restrictions pass the ill-defined undue burden test. Sup-
porters of restrictions such as the "partial-birth abortion" bans thus
can openly assert that their bans are not aimed at preserving wo-
men's health, and they need not fear that courts will automatically
invalidate the bans because their underlying purpose is constitu-
tionally impermissible.
In Stenberg v. Carhart,45 the Court addressed the constitutional-
ity of Nebraska's "partial-birth abortion" ban. The Court's deci-
sion invalidating the ban confirms that there are limits to what a
state may do to further its interest in the fetus. Certainly, sweeping
restrictions like the one addressed in Carhart, which the Court
found amounted to a virtual ban on second-trimester abortions, are
not permissible. Nevertheless, Carhart offers only a few significant
insights into the Casey standard. While positive in its outcome,
Carhart did little to clarify the ambiguities and practical problems
in Casey that cast doubt on whether Casey's standard can be ap-
plied to less extreme restrictions in a fair, predictable manner and
whether it can be relied on to keep the right to abortion robust.
Carhart struck Nebraska's "partial-birth abortion" ban in a 5-4
decision, holding it unconstitutional because it lacked a health ex-
141. See id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
142. See, e.g., id. at 930-31 (describing Nebraska's claims that "the law 'show[s] con-
cern for the life of the unborn,' 'prevent[s] cruelty to partially born children,' and
'preserve[s] the integrity of the medical profession.'").
143. See id. at 951-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1976). In Dan-
forth, the Court found that a Missouri ban on the saline amniocentesis method of
abortion would prohibit a safe procedure and the one most commonly used after the
first trimester: "[A]s a practical matter, [the ban] forces a woman and her physician to
terminate her pregnancy by methods more dangerous to her health than the method
outlawed." Id. at 79. It thus "fails as a reasonable regulation for the protection of
maternal health. It comes into focus, instead, as an unreasonable or arbitrary regula-
tion designed to inhibit, and having the effect of inhibiting, the vast majority of abor-
tions after the first 12 weeks. As such, it does not withstand constitutional challenge."
Id.
145. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 914.
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ception and because it imposed an undue burden on a woman's
abortion decision by prohibiting safe and common abortion proce-
dures. 4 6 The majority line-up included a notable defection from
the Casey alliance: Justice Breyer wrote for the majority and was
joined by Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens, while
Justice Kennedy, a co-author of Casey, added his voice to dissent-
ers Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas. The majority in Carhart
seemed to apply Casey straightforwardly and to arrive easily at its
result, but a closer examination of the opinion reveals subtle hints
that the Court may have achieved its slim majority only with delib-
erately ambiguous drafting.
While Justice Kennedy did not pronounce himself ready to over-
rule Roe, he wrote an embittered dissent in which he sharply dis-
agreed with the majority's interpretation of Casey's rulings on the
health exception requirement and the state interests underlying
abortion regulation.147 In Casey, Kennedy had co-authored an
opinion expounding women's liberty interest in abortion, defend-
ing the right with such statements as: "[The woman's] suffering is
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more,
upon its own vision of the woman's role .... The destiny of the
woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society. ' 148 Kennedy
now openly displayed virulent personal revulsion at abortion, tak-
ing it upon himself to translate what he viewed as the Court's
overly clinical descriptions of the procedures at issue into grue-
some terms fitting the perspective of one "shocked when con-
fronted with a new method of ending human life. 1 49 Pointing an
accusing finger at Justice O'Connor throughout the opinion,15 °
Kennedy gave every impression of a Justice who had been lured
into joining Casey's controlling opinion on the assumption that the
decision would rarely interfere with states' discretion in enacting
abortion restrictions and who felt betrayed by the outcome in
Carhart.
Justice Kennedy's angry desertion reveals how Casey merely put
a false front of consensus over a serious and unabated divide
among its authors as to how far a state can go in restricting abor-
tion. The Court had clearly achieved agreement that states could
146. Id. at 937-38.
147. See id. at 956-79.
148. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
149. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
150. See, e.g., id. at 967-68, 972, 977-78 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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not totally ban abortion, but the three-Justice coalition in Casey
had failed to reach the elusive middle ground regarding lesser re-
strictions that truce-minded Justices on both sides of the abortion
controversy could accept. 151 Indeed, in Carhart, Justice Scalia
gloated about the futility of the Court's search for common ground
in the abortion war:
While I am in an I-told-you-so mood, I must recall my bemse-
ment, in Casey, at the majority opinion's expressed belief
that . . . the decision in Casey would ratify [a] happy truce
[achieved in Roe].... I cannot understand why [certain Justices]
persist in the belief that this Court ... can resolve th[e] conten-
tion and controversy [engendered by abortion] rather than be
consumed by it.152
A. The State's Interest in Fetal Welfare
Casey's greatest blow to abortion rights was its expansion of the
state's right to restrict abortion in the name of the fetus. 153 The
decision's other major drawbacks-its weakening of the standard
against which to measure abortion restrictions and its failure to af-
firm unequivocally the primacy of women's health-can be traced
to this fundamental departure from Roe. Carhart left undisturbed
Casey's increased regard for the state's fetal interest. At the same
time, it dodged the issue of whether the state may justify abortion
restrictions for reasons other than to try to save the lives of fetuses.
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, examined the state's in-
terests supporting Nebraska's ban and concluded that the ban
"does not directly further an interest 'in the potentiality of human
life' by saving the fetus in question from destruction, as it regulates
only a method of performing abortion."' 54 Nebraska, however, as-
serted indirect fetal interests, claiming that the ban "shows concern
for the life of the unborn" and "prevents cruelty to partially born
children.' 1 55 It also claimed that the ban "preserves the integrity of
the medical profession.' 56 The majority opinion did not answer
151. See generally Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise: Inevitable and Impossible,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 921 (1992).
152. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 955-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. See supra at Part II.B.
154. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930. The Court ultimately found that the ban prohibited
more than a single method. See infra note 191 and text accompanying note 210.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 931.
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whether these are legitimate state interests because it found that a
health exception was required regardless of the interest asserted.'57
Two concurring Justices denied that the state had any valid inter-
est in enacting the ban. Justice Ginsburg noted that "this law does
not save any fetus from destruction .... Nor does the statute seek
to protect the lives or health of pregnant women."' 58 Given that
the state purportedly meant to allow other, equally distasteful pro-
cedures, Ginsburg concluded that "the law prohibits the procedure
[simply] because the state legislators seek to chip away at the pri-
vate choice shielded by Roe v. Wade.' 59 She declared, "'[I]f a stat-
ute burdens constitutional rights and all that can be said on its
behalf is that it is the vehicle that legislators have chosen for ex-
pressing their hostility to those rights, the burden is undue."' 160
Justice Stevens stated that, because the Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "liberty" encompasses the
"woman's right to make this difficult and extremely personal deci-
sion," it was "impossible for [him] to understand how a State has
any legitimate interest in requiring a doctor to follow any procedure
other than the one that he or she reasonably believes will best pro-
tect the woman in her exercise of this constitutional liberty.'
' 6 1
Justice Stevens's opinion, however, reflects a pre-Casey conception
of the abortion right, one in which the woman's welfare alone is
central to legitimate regulation of pre-viability abortion. Given
Casey's disavowal of this conception, 62 the Carhart majority's re-
fusal to reject the ban as furthering no legitimate state interest is
not surprising.
Unfortunately, although not unexpectedly, the majority opinion
did not adopt Justices Stevens's and Ginsburg's views of the imper-
missibility of Nebraska's interests in enacting the ban. It also did
not say whether the state's interests in the fetus and in the woman's
157. Id. at 930-31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 951-52.
160. Id. at 952 (quoting Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Posner, C.J., dissenting)). Ginsburg further claimed that a "substantial obstacle"
(i.e., an undue burden) exists any time a state "stops a woman from choosing the
procedure her doctor 'reasonably believes will best protect'" her. Id. (citation
omitted).
161. Id. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Stevens also asserted
that, even if one believed that abortion were not protected as a fundamental right, the
ban should be struck as unconstitutional because it was "simply irrational" in prohib-
iting one procedure while permitting others "equally gruesome." Id. at 946-47.
162. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (noting that Roe's
framework "misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman's interest [and] under-
values the State's interest in potential life").
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health are the only legitimate interests that the state may advance.
Even assuming the state's interests are so limited, Carhart did not
address the breadth of the state's interest in the fetus and whether
it includes related but more atmospheric interests such as "fetal
dignity," an interest Nebraska asserted. Although the Court ac-
knowledged that Nebraska's ban did not further the state's interest
in the fetus as that interest is normally understood-the interest in
saving a fetus from destruction-it did not declare that the state's
fetal interest must always be so narrowly conceived. 163
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, promoted an alarmingly
broad view of the state interests that could justify pre-viability re-
strictions. 64 Asserting that "Casey is premised on the States hav-
ing an important constitutional role in defining their interests in
the abortion debate," Kennedy claimed that Casey "held it was in-
appropriate for the Judicial Branch to provide an exhaustive list of
state interests implicated by abortion. ' 165 Kennedy asserted that a
state's legitimate interests could include "concern for the life of the
unborn and 'for the partially-born,' [and interests] in preserving
the integrity of the medical profession, and in 'erecting a barrier to
infanticide.' 166 Since the majority did not firmly reject these in-
terests as valid justifications for pre-viability restrictions, legisla-
tures may well perceive an invitation to experiment with what
kinds of state interests they may advance through abortion
restrictions.
Carhart's frustrating refusal to address directly the legitimacy of
the state's interests can most likely be attributed to the need to
persuade Justice O'Connor to join the opinion. Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg clearly saw the ban as not furthering any legitimate
state interest. Justices Breyer and Souter may have had sympathy
for that view as well. Justice O'Connor, however, was willing to
tolerate some procedure bans, and she went out of her way to as-
sert that "a ban on partial birth abortion that only proscribed the
D&X method of abortion and that included an exception to pre-
163. Justice Thomas pointed out that, by considering whether the ban imposed an
undue burden, the majority assumed that the state had a legitimate interest in enact-
ing it. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1008 n.18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 961 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
165. Id. It is by no means clear that Casey held any such thing. Justice Kennedy
apparently relied on Casey's ambiguous and passing reference to statutes supported
by "the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest." Casey, 505 U.S. at
877 (emphasis added). Elsewhere on that page, the Casey joint opinion referred only
to the state's interest in the fetus or in potential life and said it was permissible for the
state to "express profound respect for the life of the unborn." Id.
166. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 961-62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
70520041
706 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
serve the life and health of the mother would be constitutional.
167
By ducking the issue of the legitimacy of the state's interests and
focusing instead on the absence of a health exception, the majority
was able to agree on the grounds for striking down Nebraska's ban.
But in doing so, the Court failed to reject categorically any limita-
tion on a woman's right to choose the procedure her physician rea-
sonably believes will best protect her. 68
B. The Health Exception Requirement
The absence of a health exception was perhaps the most obvious
constitutional flaw in Nebraska's "partial-birth abortion" ban. The
Court in Carhart began its analysis with a discussion of this flaw.
1 69
Notwithstanding Justice Breyer's assurance that it was a "straight-
forward application," the Court faced a number of issues in apply-
ing the health exception requirement. Although it favorably
resolved some important questions left open by Casey, Carhart's
conclusions were cautious and conservative. Anti-choice advocates
will no doubt pounce upon these aspects of Carhart in an attempt
to blunt the decision's impact.17 0
Notably, the majority separated its health exception discussion
and its undue burden analysis, treating the health exception as an
independent requirement. The majority's approach thus rejected
Casey's suggestion that the health exception requirement might be
subject to the undue burden standard.1 71 This was an important
clarification that should prove helpful in challenging abortion re-
strictions that lack a health exception.1 72
167. Id. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. See Women's Medical Prof 1 Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 447 (6th Cir. 2003)
("In a broader sense, even by focusing on the need for a health exception, the Court
invites state regulation of abortion methods. If it were otherwise, the Court would
have held, in a straightforward fashion, that states may not interfere at all with medi-
cal discretion when abortions are involved.").
169. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930-38.
170. At least one court has already relied upon Carhart's qualified language to up-
hold a ban on D&X with a limited health exception. See Women's Medical Profl
Corp., 353 F.3d at 448.
171. Justice Thomas took issue with the majority's approach, arguing that Casey
indeed intended for the health exception to be subject to the undue burden standard.
Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1011 n.20, 1012-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy ap-
peared to adopt the same view. See id. at 964-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that a ban on D&X without a health exception would "not amount to a substantial
obstacle to the abortion right").
172. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains Servs. v. Owens, 287 F.3d
910, 917 (D. Colo. 2002) (relying on Carhart in affirming invalidation of parental noti-
fication for abortion law based on lack of health exception). But see Women's Medi-
cal Prof l Corp., 353 F.3d at 447 ("While the majority opinion in Carhart does not
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The Court set out the health exception requirement as formu-
lated in Roe: "[S]ubsequent to viability, the State ...may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother."'73 Nebraska's "partial-birth abor-
tion" ban applied throughout pregnancy, but the Court explained
that Roe's demand for a health exception in post-viability restric-
tions applies with equal or greater force before viability.174 Carhart
thus stated explicitly what Casey had implicitly confirmed: "Since
the law requires a health exception in order to validate even a
postviability abortion regulation, it at a minimum requires the
same in respect to previability regulation.' 1 75 This is so, the Court
explained, because "[t]he State's interest in regulating abortion
previability is considerably weaker than postviability.'
' 76
Justice Thomas, dissenting, argued that the principle the Court
articulated applies only to situations where the pregnancy itself
threatens the woman's health.1 7 7 "[Roe and Casey] addressed only
the situation in which a woman must obtain an abortion because of
some threat to her health from continued pregnancy," Thomas as-
serted. "But [they] say nothing at all about cases in which a physi-
cian considers one prohibited method of abortion to be preferable
to permissible methods.' 78  The majority responded that the
Court's precedents:
[r]ecognize that a State cannot subject women's health to signifi-
cant risks both in that context, and also where state regulations
force women to use riskier methods of abortion. Our cases have
repeatedly invalidated statutes that in the process of regulating
the methods of abortion, imposed significant health risks. They
make clear that a risk to a women's [sic] health is the same
whether it happens to arise from regulating a particular method
of abortion, or from barring abortion entirely.' 79
employ the undue burden standard explicitly in connection with the health exception
issue, its analysis [of the health exception requirement] reflects Casey's acknowledg-
ment of the importance of reconciling profound state interests and personal rights.").
173. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930 (quotation marks omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1010.
179. Id. at 931. Justice O'Connor agreed that "the Nebraska statute is inconsistent
with Casey because it lacks an exception for those instances when the banned proce-
dure is necessary to preserve the health of the mother." Id. at 947 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added). This statement is somewhat opaque, however, since it
is not clear what she meant by "necessary to preserve the health of the mother." Did
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The Court thus clarified that, at least with respect to restrictions on
abortion procedures, the health exception requirement applies not
only to unhealthy pregnancies, but also to any pregnancy-healthy
or not-when harm is caused by the abortion regulation itself.1i 0
In articulating the health exception requirement in Carhart, the
majority referred exclusively to pre-Casey decisions, in which the
Court had said that, when acting to further its interest in the fetus,
a state may not impose a "trade-off" between the woman's health
and fetal welfare.181 The majority claimed that these rulings were
"re-affirmed in Casey,' 82 although they were not mentioned at all
in Casey's discussion of the medical emergency exception.'83
Moreover, Casey had not clearly affirmed the principle that a state
may never impose a "trade-off" between the woman's health and
fetal welfare. 84 Carhart did not go quite that far either: in stating
that "a State cannot subject women's health to significant risks,"'85
the majority appeared to adopt a formulation of the "no trade-off"
principle that turns on the significance of the risk imposed. 186 The
Court offered no guidance, however, for determining whether any
given health risk is "significant." '187
The addition of the word "significant" may, again, reflect a con-
cession necessary to garner the vote of Justice O'Connor, who
she refer to situations in which, as majority indicated, the procedure is simply the
safest among safe procedures (even for a healthy woman)? Or was she referring only
to women whose health is already at risk?
180. Justice Kennedy denied that Nebraska's ban required an exception to protect
the woman's health, referring to the "vice of a health exception resting in the physi-
cian's discretion." Id. at 972 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy would have permit-
ted the state to subject women to some unspecified measure of increased health risks
in order to accommodate its desire to address the "grave moral issues presented by a
new abortion method." Id. at 967. "Unsubstantiated and generalized health differ-
ences which are, at best, marginal, do not amount to a substantial obstacle to the
abortion right," he declared. Id. at 967-68.
181. See id., at 931 (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 76-79 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 197 (1973)).
182. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 931.
183. Id.; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992) (discussing
the medical emergency exception).
184. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874-75; see also supra notes 128-37 and accompanying
text.
185. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 931 (emphasis added).
186. Id.; see also Women's Medical Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 448 (6th Cir.
2003) (asserting that Carhart "firmly recasts" the Court's no-trade-off decisions "in
the 'significant health risk' mold").
187. In Thornburgh, the Court refused to read the term "significant" as denoting
merely meaningful or real. See supra note 135.
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might have insisted on the qualifier in order to preserve the possi-
bility of upholding health exceptions that allow some margin of
risk. The joint opinion in Casey, as well as earlier O'Connor dis-
sents, suggest that O'Connor feels ambivalent about how much
health risk a state should be allowed to impose.188 Whatever the
Court's reasons for including the "significant" qualifier, some will
construe Carhart's repeated use of this modifier to allow for lim-
ited health exceptions that impose some measure of increased
health risks on women. At least one lower court has already ap-
plied Carhart in this manner. 189
The next issue the Carhart Court faced in evaluating the ban's
lack of a health exception was whether all procedure bans require a
health exception or whether an exception is required only when
the banned procedure may be safer than other methods. The
Court took the latter position, examining the safety of the dilation
and extraction ("D&X") method that Nebraska claimed to tar-
get 9° before concluding that the ban required a health excep-
tion. 91 The Court reviewed the medical evidence regarding the
safety of D&X and concluded that "a statute that altogether for-
bids D&X creates a significant health risk. The statute conse-
quently must contain a health exception. 192
In assessing the safety of D&X, the Court recognized that
"[d]octors often differ in their estimation of comparative health
risks and appropriate treatment." 193 Therefore, the majority opin-
ion said, Casey's phrase "necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
188. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 832 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I express no opinion as to the point at
which a 'trade-off between the health of the woman and the survival of the fetus
would rise to the level of an undue burden.").
189. Women's Medical Prof'l Corp., 353 F.3d at 444, 448, 453 (upholding ban on
D&X with a health exception limited to abortions "necessary, in reasonable medical
judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother as a result of the mother's life
or health being endangered by a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impair-
ment of a major bodily function"). Id. at 440.
190. The procedure is also known as intact dilation and evacuation ("intact D&E").
In fact, the Court ultimately determined that the ban encompassed more than this one
procedure, also banning dilation and evacuation ("D&E"), the most commonly used
procedure for second-trimester abortions. See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 927. For purposes
of the health exception discussion, however, the Court treated the ban as though it
reached only D&X.
191. Id. at 937-78. Justice Stevens, although joining the majority opinion, ques-
tioned the state's prerogative ever to second guess a physician's choice of procedure if
the physician "reasonably believes" the procedure will "best protect the woman." Id.
at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 938.
193. Id. at 937.
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ment, ' ' 194 to preserve a woman's life or health "cannot refer to an
absolute necessity or to absolute proof." '195 Nevertheless, in decid-
ing whether the state could ban the procedure, the Court did not
leave the question of a procedure's appropriateness solely to an
individual doctor's reasonable medical judgment: "This is not to
say... that a State is prohibited from proscribing an abortion pro-
cedure whenever a particular physician deems the procedure pref-
erable. By no means must a State grant physicians 'unfettered
discretion' in their selection of abortion methods." '196 Although spe-
cifically rejecting the need for medical consensus, the Court
seemed to require a fairly high level of "medical authority" con-
firming the method's safety: "[W]here substantial medical authority
supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion proce-
dure could endanger women's health, Casey requires the statute to
include a health exception when the procedure is 'necessary, in ap-
propriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.' ,197
In reality, however, physicians are never granted "unfettered dis-
cretion" in determining the course of medical treatment because
the threat of malpractice and loss of license constrains them. In
malpractice cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in estab-
lishing that a physician's conduct, or choice of procedure, in a given
case has caused harm. Carhart's "substantial medical authority"
requirement, however, shifts the burden of proof to the physician,
or to women needing the banned procedure, to establish the need
for an exception to the ban. Thus, a state is free to enact a genera-
lized ban, and it may omit a health exception unless the physician
can show that "substantial medical authority" supports the need
194. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
195. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 937. But see Women's Medical Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 353
F.3d 436, 447 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Although Carhart cautions that the term 'necessary'
does not 'refer to an absolute necessity or to absolute proof,' the word cannot be
emptied entirely of its distinctive meaning by being equated with 'desirable.' As used
in Roe and developed in Carhart, it at least denotes some measure of compul-
sion . . . " (citations omitted)).
196. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 938 (emphasis added).
197. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879). Elsewhere, the Court
referred to "significant medical authority." Id. at 932. Justice O'Connor likewise em-
phasized the need for medical authority establishing D&X as safe:
[Tihe need for a health exception does not arise from the individual views of
Dr. Carhart .... (Rather] where, as here, a significant body of medical opin-
ion believes a procedure may bring with it greater safety for some patients
and explains the medical reasons supporting that view ... the statute [must]
include a health exception.
Id. at 948 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
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for one. Conditioning the necessity of a health exception on the
physician's proof of "substantial medical authority" unfairly sub-
jects abortion to a unique standard. This is particularly unwar-
ranted where, as here, the state purports to base the ban on its
interest in the fetus, not on an interest in protecting women from a
dangerous abortion method. If instead all abortion procedure bans
were required to contain a health exception for when the doctor
reasonably believes, in the exercise of her best medical judgment,
that the procedure is safest, women should be adequately
protected.
The Court's decision in Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to
Roe, supports the latter view. 198 In Doe, the Court invalidated pro-
visions of Georgia's abortion law that required confirmation by
two other physicians and approval by a committee before any
abortion could be performed. 19 9 The Court pointed out that no
other medical or surgical procedure was subject to these require-
ments and concluded that women were sufficiently protected by
"[t]he statute's emphasis ...on the attending physician's 'best
clinical judgment."' 20 0 The Court noted:
If a physician is licensed by the State, he is recognized by the
State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. If he
fails in this professional censure and the deprivation of his li-
cense are available as remedies .... [R]eliance must be placed
upon the assurance given by his license, issued by an authority
competent to judge in that respect, that [the physician] possesses
the requisite qualifications.2 °1
While Carhart concluded that the "substantial" or "significant"
medical authority requirement had been met on the record before
it, the Court did not indicate whether less extensive proof of safety
would suffice to mandate a health exception. The Court in Carhart
acknowledged that the record reflected disagreement among plain-
tiffs' and defendants' experts on the safety issue, but the Court was
aslo presented with voluminous evidence on the safety of the D&X
procedure,20 2 a record amassed through years of "partial-birth
198. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
199. Id. at 197-99.
200. Id. at 199.
201. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 122-23 (1889)).
202. See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 932-36.
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abortion" litigation across the country.2 °3 Would the Court have
reached a different conclusion if the procedure had been banned
before the evidence was as fully developed? And, even if the Car-
hart majority would have been satisfied with less evidence, how can
plaintiffs and lower courts determine the perimeters of the "sub-
stantial medical authority" requirement? Until the standard has
been applied to more fact scenarios, these questions will remain.
Carhart's failure to require a health exception in every abortion
procedure ban may mean that some courts will be hesitant to inval-
idate as a matter of law procedure bans lacking such an exception.
For example, when Congress recently passed a "partial-birth abor-
tion" ban, it refused to add a health exception, notwithstanding the
Court's decision in Carhart.204 Given the similarity between the
federal ban and the Nebraska ban struck in Carhart, it would seem
that courts addressing the federal ban could have ruled on the
health exception question without a trial. In all three challenges to
the federal ban, however, the judges have held trials in which the
205 I n ae hbanned procedures' safety is a major issue. In one case, the
judge denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, in which
plaintiffs claimed that the ban was invalid as a matter of law under
Carhart because it lacked a health exception. Instead, the judge
interpreted Carhart to call for an inquiry into the banned proce-
dures' safety.20 6
203. For a periodically updated list of "partial-birth abortion" bans passed and
challenged nationwide, see Center for Reproductive Rights, "Partial Birth Abortion"
Bans, at http://www.crlp.org/stlawpba.html (last updated Feb. 3, 2004).
204. See Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2004). The ban
is under challenge in three separate cases: Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Ashcroft,
No. C03-4872 PJH, 2004 WL 432222, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004); Carhart v. Ash-
croft, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Neb. 2003); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 287 F.
Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
205. See Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Federal Trials To Determine Constitu-
tionality of Abortion Ban Begin in Three Cities, KAISER DAILY REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH REP., Mar. 30, 2004, at http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-ind
ex.cfm?hint=2&DRID=22 933 (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
206. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ.8695 (RCC), 2004 WL 540470, *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2004) ("The constitutionality of the Act must be judged according
to Stenberg's requirement that abortion regulations must include a maternal health
exception if 'a significant body of medical opinion believes a procedure brings with it
greater safety advantages."' (citing Carhart, 530 U.S. at 937)). The federal ban is
distinctive both in that it is the first congressional ban on an abortion method and
because Congress purported to avoid the health exception requirement by including
detailed congressional "findings" that the ban is never medically necessary. Id. at *11.
Courts applying Carhart to state "partial-birth abortion" bans may be more willing to
strike as a matter of law bans that lack a health exception. See, e.g., Richmond Med.
Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376, 377 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., concurring)
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The Carhart decision would have protected women's health far
more strongly had it established explicitly and unreservedly that a
procedure ban must always include an exception that permits a
doctor to rely on her best medical judgment in determining how to
carry out an abortion. The Court shied away from such an absolute
pronouncement, perhaps recognizing that automatically requiring
such a health exception would, at least in theory, render most pro-
cedure bans toothless.20 7 The majority's formulation thus suggests
the possibility that some procedure bans might be constitutional
even without a health exception.
In sum, Carhart's treatment of the health exception requirement
clarified important aspects of the requirement that had been uncer-
tain after Casey. The health exception requirement is an indepen-
dent one; it is not subject to the undue burden test. The
requirement applies to eliminate risks caused by the abortion regu-
lation itself and not merely those caused by a risky pregnancy. At
the same time, the Court's careful use of qualifiers like "signifi-
cant" and "substantial" suggest that at least some members of the
majority wanted to leave open the possibility of upholding some
restrictions that impose an increased risk to a woman's health.
C. The Undue Burden Standard
The majority in Carhart concluded that, independent of the
health exception flaw, Nebraska's "partial-birth abortion" ban
posed an undue burden.20 8 Here, the Court's task was made easier
by the fact that, given the Court's reading of the statute, the Ne-
braska attorney general essentially conceded the undue burden
question.20 9 The Court read the ban to encompass not only D&X,
the single procedure Nebraska claimed it targeted, but also D&E,
("The [Supreme] Court has now unequivocally held that any ban on partial-birth
abortion must include an exception for the health of the mother" (emphasis added)).
207. See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 965. In fact, even a ban with a broad health exception
is likely to have a chilling effect on physicians, especially if criminal penalties are
attached. As it is, Justices Kennedy and Thomas accused the Court of deferring too
much to the physician's discretion. Plaintiff Dr. Leroy Carhart testified that he per-
forms D&X whenever possible in the second trimester because, in his medical judg-
ment, it is safer for women in the middle to later part of the second trimester. See id.
at 928. Leaving the application of the health exception to the doctor's discretion
would appear to allow Dr. Carhart to perform the procedure whenever he felt it was
safer; if so, he could continue to perform it as often he did before. This prospect led
Justice Kennedy to complain that "[r]equiring Nebraska to defer to Dr. Carhart's
judgment is no different from forbidding Nebraska from enacting a ban at all." Id. at
965 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 945-46.
209. See id. at 917.
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the most commonly used method of second-trimester abortion.21 °
Although the attorney general disputed that the ban had this
scope, he did not dispute that under the Court's construction the
ban was unconstitutional. 211 The Court's undue burden discussion
was thus primarily an exercise in statutory construction. Once the
Court determined that the ban prohibited D&E, its job was
finished.
Because the Court reached its undue burden conclusion so eas-
ily, Carhart offered no undue burden analysis that might give
needed shape and content to the undue burden standard. Having
devoted pages to the far more complicated question of why the ban
prohibited not only D&X but D&E, the Court needed only one
paragraph to explain its conclusion that the ban therefore imposed
an undue burden:
In sum, using this law some present prosecutors and future At-
torneys General may choose to pursue physicians who use D&E
procedures, the most commonly used method for performing
previability second trimester abortions. All those who perform
abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution,
conviction, and imprisonment. The result is an undue burden
upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision. We must
consequently find the statute unconstitutional.212
It seems self-evident that a ban on the most common method of
abortion in a given stage of pregnancy creates a substantial obsta-
cle. The Court clearly saw no reason to elaborate.213 But knowing
more about why the Court believed the ban imposed an undue bur-
den might have helped illuminate the contours of the undue bur-
den test. For example, the Court would likely have pointed out
that the ban left no alternative procedure whatsoever in the early
part of the second trimester.21 4 If this were the Court's primary or
210. Id. at 930; see also supra note 190.
211. Id. at 933. Justices Kennedy and Thomas likewise appeared to assume that, if
the ban prohibited D&E and not merely D&X, it would be unconstitutional. See id.
at 972-73, 978 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ban should have been con-
strued narrowly and, read that way, did not impose an undue burden); Id. at 990, 1013
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (same as previous cite).
212. Id. at 945-46.
213. The Court undoubtedly would have found it harder to reach agreement among
the five Justices in the majority had it tried to impart more content to the terms "un-
due burden" and "substantial obstacle."
214. See, e.g., Rhode Island Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 297, 313
(D.R.I. 1999) (discussing unavailability of alternative procedures to D&E from the
beginning of the second trimester until approximately sixteen weeks of pregnancy),
affid, 239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2001).
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only stated reason for finding an undue burden, this could indicate
that the term "undue burden" is reserved for those restrictions that
effectively remove the abortion option altogether. The Court
might also have discussed the health risks implicated by the re-
maining available procedures; if so, its discussion might have pro-
vided some insight into the level of state-imposed risk that the
Court would or would not find acceptable.215 Or the Court might
have recognized that the remaining procedures not prohibited by
the ban imposed unacceptable burdens on women apart from phys-
ical risk, for example, causing the woman to suffer more pain and
emotional trauma.216 Such a conclusion would indicate that "un-
due burden" encompasses more than simply bans and virtual bans
on abortion.
Instead, Carhart tells us little more about the undue burden test
than what we could already gather from Casey. At minimum, re-
strictions are invalid under the undue burden test if the Justices
view them as imposing an insurmountable obstacle on women
seeking abortions. Whether and to what extent the Court would
employ the standard to strike down less burdensome restrictions
remains uncertain. Nothing in either Casey or Carhart's applica-
tion of the undue burden test definitively answers this question.
IV. CONCLUSION
Roe v. Wade undeniably advanced women's equality and auton-
omy when it boldly established abortion as a fundamental constitu-
tional right. But the decision simultaneously opened a Pandora's
box by acknowledging that the government has an interest in fetal
welfare that may sometimes override the woman's rights. Under
Roe, the conflict between the state's fetal interest and the woman's
right to abortion was, at least theoretically, confined to the post-
viability period. However uncontroversial it may seem to insist on
limits to a woman's right to abort a viable fetus, Roe's basis for
limiting that right-the recognition of a sufficiently weighty gov-
ernmental interest in potential life-is one that could easily be ap-
plied to abortions earlier in pregnancy. With the door left ajar in
Roe, it was perhaps inevitable that subsequent decisions would
215. See, e.g., id. at 313-14 (discussing risks imposed by labor induction abortions,
the major alternative to D&E after approximately sixteen weeks of pregnancy).
216. See, e.g., id. at 313 (discussing difficult "psychological effects" of labor induc-
tion abortions).
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push it open wider and wider.217 To allow the state to advance its
interest in the fetus at any stage of pregnancy automatically raises
the questions why it should not be allowed to do so at other stages
and why the interest is always subordinate to the woman's health.
But by officially inviting this conflict into the pre-viability period,
Casey created a predicament from which the Court will not soon
extricate itself.
Casey clearly paved the way for far greater state encroachment
on the right to abortion in the name of fetal welfare. But while
Casey gutted much of Roe, it retained Roe's protection both
against absolute bans on abortion and against serious restrictions
that are equivalent to a ban. Carhart reaffirmed Casey's promise
that there are limits to permissible restrictions designed to advance
the state's interest in the fetus, demonstrating that a solid majority
of the current Court agrees that the undue burden test prohibits
the most extreme abortion restrictions. Many women today thus
remain able to obtain abortions when they need them.
Carhart does not prove that Casey left much of Roe intact, how-
ever. The undue burden standard continues to lack sufficient struc-
ture and content to guard effectively against burdensome abortion
restrictions. And the more the individual restrictions pile up, the
greater the overall barriers to women seeking abortions. These
barriers are especially daunting, even insurmountable, for poor wo-
men, teenagers, and women living in rural areas. The fact that af-
fluent, adult women still enjoy access to abortions should never
obscure the disturbing reality that too many other women-partic-
ularly those who wield the least political power-are completely
denied abortions thanks to the restrictions Casey allows. The
Court, while claiming to uphold Roe's "essence," in fact has
stripped much of its substance. For the growing numbers of wo-
men who find it impossible to overcome the obstacles that states
throw in their path, the shell that remains is not enough.
217. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (allowing states to
enact pre-viability legislation based on interest in fetus is "the inevitable consequence
of our holding [in Roe] that the State has an interest in protecting the life of the
unborn").
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